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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
- an opportunity for Ukraine - 
 
In 2003, the European Union has decided to introduce a trading scheme for 
emission allowances of greenhouse gas. Starting from 2005 the scheme 
requires installations of the main-emitting sectors (energy, ferrous metal, 
mineral industry, pulp and paper) in all member states to hold certified 
allowances in the amount of their actual emission levels. After an initial 
allocation of allowances, affected companies can either trade them with one 
another, or import additional emission certificates by reducing emission 
levels in non-EU countries according to the rules set by the project-based 
mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol (e.g. Joint Implementation). Thus, the 
scheme offers interesting opportunities for non-EU countries like Ukraine 
with a good potential for such climate investment. In particular, it generates 
a great more deal of security for the evolving market for emission 
certificates since its introduction has irreversibly been decided, and it will be 
in place even in the extreme case that the Kyoto protocol fails to get into 
force. 
Despite the economic potential for Ukraine, policy makers have so far done 
little to utilize them. As a result, Ukraine has not yet participated in the 
evolving carbon market and international ratings perceive the conditions for 
project-based climate investments to be rather weak. Consequently, the 
paper finishes with recommending necessary policy measures, in particular 
ratification of the Kyoto protocol and signing bilateral agreements on 
emission trade with interested EU countries. 
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1. Introduction 
When approving the Kyoto protocol in April 2002, the member states of the 
European Union decided to jointly fulfill their commitments to reduce 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve this goal, the European 
Parliament and the European Council established a scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission trading within the Community in October 2003 (directive 
2003/87/EC). Furthermore, a second directive links the EU trading scheme 
with the global scheme of the Kyoto protocol so that also non-EU countries 
can benefit by trading emission certificates.1 In this paper we explain the 
relevant mechanisms of the EU scheme as well as the possibilities and 
potential for Ukraine. 
 
2. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The objective of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 8% of the level of 1990, which 
corresponds to the commitment set by the Kyoto protocol. Initially, the 
European trading scheme will affect installations of the following activities:2 
I. Energy activities 
- Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (except 
hazardous or municipal waste installations) 
- Mineral oil refineries  
- Coke ovens 
II. Production and processing of ferrous metals 
- Metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting or sintering installations  
- Installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary fusion) 
including continuous casting, with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tons per hour 
III. Mineral industry 
- Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a production 
capacity exceeding 500 tons per day or lime in rotary kilns with a production 
capacity exceeding 50 tons per day or in other furnaces with a production capacity 
exceeding 50 tons per day 
- Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with a melting 
capacity exceeding 20 tons per day 
- Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in particular 
roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or porcelain, with a 
production capacity exceeding 75 tons per day, and/or with a kiln capacity 
exceeding 4 m3 and with a setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m3 
                                          
1 See Policy Paper S22 (“Ukraine and the Kyoto Protocol: large prospects, but an unfinished 
agenda”) for a detailed discussion of the protocol, its implications as well as policy 
recommendations. 
2 Specified in Annex II of directive 2003/87/EC. 
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IV. Other activities 
- Industrial plants for the production of 
(a) pulp from timber or other fibrous materials 
(b) paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tons per day 
The European trading scheme will work as follows: within the periods from 
2005 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2012 each affected installation will require 
an ‘emission allowance’ for the emission of each ton of greenhouse gas.3 At 
the beginning of each period the ‘emission allowances’ are allocated to the 
installations according to a National Allocation Plan. This plan has to be 
submitted to the EU Commission by each of the 25 member countries until 
March 31, 2004. It specifies: 
(1) The total amount of ‘emission allowances’ per country within each 
period (it has to be set in compliance with the country’s national target 
set up under the Kyoto protocol), and 
(2) The initial allocation of ‘emission allowances’ among all affected 
installations within the country for each period. 
Starting from this initial allocation, all ‘emission allowances’ are fully 
tradable within each period.4 This will insure an efficient allocation of 
‘emission allowances’ (or equivalently, the lowest total abatement costs). 
 
3. Links with the Kyoto protocol 
The regulations on trade of emission allowances within the European trading 
scheme and the Kyoto protocol, which specifies the rules for a global 
emissions trading system (Box 1), are interconnected in many ways and for 
various reasons. First, the Kyoto protocol requires all parties to design their 
own national schemes for ensuring compliance with their national emission 
targets. In this sense, the European trading scheme is the common scheme 
that all 25 member states have adopted in order to fulfill their obligations. 
Second, setting the Kyoto protocol into force is an explicit policy objective of 
                                          
3 Initially this will be limited to CO2. Emissions of other Greenhouse gases from those 
installations as well as greenhouse gas emissions from installations of other sectors may be 
included only after the revision of the directive in 2006. 
4 Whether or not they are also tradable between the two periods has not been decided thus 
far. 
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the EU and its member states. The European trading scheme clearly 
demonstrates this commitment by imposing strict rules on a large part of the 
European economy even before the protocol itself gets into force (this is 
scheduled only for 2008). Third, flexibility and efficiency of an emission-
trading scheme increase with market size, and prices for allowances 
decrease with increasing supply. Thus, combining the European trading 
scheme with its large expected demand for allowances and the emission 
trading scheme of the Kyoto protocol with a large expected supply overhang 
is clearly in the interest of the EU economy and thus, necessary to receive 
the political acceptance of the European trading scheme.  
Box 1 The Kyoto protocol 
In 1997 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) initiated 
the so-called Kyoto protocol with the objective of reducing global emission levels of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) from 2008 to 2012 (the so-called first commitment period) by 
5.2% relative to the level of 1990a by initiating a global trading scheme of GHG emission 
certificates. Each country that signs the protocol is assigned a certain emission target, the 
so-called Assigned Amounts (AA).b After ratification, the country is obliged to meet this 
target in the so-called commitment period from 2008 to 2012, either by actively reducing its 
own emission levels, or by using so-called flexible instruments of the protocol within which 
emission certificates can be traded. Those instruments are: 
• Emission Trading (ET): An inventory-based mechanism where a country is allowed to 
sell the unused emission rights (the so-called Assigned Amount Units, AAUs) if actual 
emission levels over the commitment period (2008-2012) are below the country’s 
emission target (the Assigned Amount, AA). 
• Joint Implementation (JI): A project-based mechanism where a country achieves a 
reduction of emission levels through investment in another country listed in Annex I of 
the protocol. This reduction (relative to a pre-specified baseline) is generated into 
equivalent Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) and transferred on its own account. 
• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): Allows for similar emission reduction projects in 
developing countries (not listed in Annex I). 
The logic of those mechanisms is as follows: Countries whose emission levels exceed their 
targets can either buy unused emission certificates through ET from other countries, or they 
have to actively reduce emission levels. However, such reduction efforts do not necessarily 
have to be located within the country. Rather, the two project-based mechanism (JI and 
CDM) ensure that such projects will be initiated in countries where the abatement costs are 
expected to be the lowest. Given the large differences in e.g. technology or energy 
efficiency across Annex I countries, differences in abatement costs are expected to be 
significant. 
a A second commitment period is envisaged from 2013 to 2017, but no concrete objectives 
are specified as of now. 
b Typically, for countries in transition this target equals their emission levels in 1990. 
 
Formally, the two trading schemes are connected during the second period 
of the European trading scheme, which exactly coincides with the first 
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commitment period of the Kyoto protocol (2008-2012). During those years it 
will be possible to import emission reductions specified within the regulations 
of the Kyoto protocol and to convert them into ‘emission allowances’ on a 
one-to-one rate (in tons of CO2 equivalent). This however will be the case 
only for reductions generated within the project-based mechanisms (Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation)5 while the Assigned 
Amount units – that is the reductions based on the difference between actual 
emission levels and the respective emission targets – are excluded. 
Furthermore, there will be no initial quota for the amount of imported 
reductions. Nevertheless, the Commission will reconsider this issue if total 
imports exceed 6% of the total amount of ‘emission allowances’ for 2008-
2012. This however is rather unlikely to be the case anytime soon after 
2008.6 
 
4. First market developments 
As stated above, the EU Commission has given its members time until March 
2004 to present their National Allocation Plan and in particular, to suggest 
the intended amount of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions within the 
two periods (2005-2007 and 2008-2012). The two main criteria for approval 
of this emission cap is that it complies with the country’s national target 
specified in the Kyoto protocol and that it is set at a level below “business as 
usual” emissions. In other words, even if a country is already expected to 
meet its obligations from the Kyoto protocol, the European trading scheme 
still requires a further reduction of emission levels. 
In January 2004, the UK was first to publish the draft National Allocation 
Plan for public consultations. With a Kyoto target of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 12.5% of its 1990 level during 2008-2012 and a national 
                                          
5 With the exception of emission allowances generated by project activities involving nuclear 
facilities, land use change and forestry projects and large hydro-installations. 
6 According to conservative estimates, the 6% threshold is estimated at around 500 million 
tons of CO2 equivalent, which roughly equals the expected total global volume of allowances 
generated by project-based mechanisms per year. Given that those allowances can also go 
to non-EU countries such as Japan and Canada or that they can also be transferred to other 
years, it appears to be quite unlikely that the 6% threshold will be might anytime soon after 
2008 (Evolution Markets Executive Brief, July 25, 2003; available at www.evomarkets.com). 
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emission reduction target of 20% below the 1990 level in 2010, the draft 
National Allocation Plan envisages a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
of 16.3% below their level of 1990. Since the European trading scheme does 
so far not include installations of all greenhouse gas-emitting activities, and 
since it so far only considers emission of CO2 rather than of the other 
greenhouse gases such as Methane (CH4) or Nitrous Oxide (N2O), this 
emission cap is rather restrictive. This signals the strong commitment of the 
UK government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by as much as possible. 
Meanwhile, while most other member states have already signaled to have 
their first draft ready on time, only Spain, Greece and Poland are expected 
to experience some problems in meeting the deadline in March 2004 as the 
discussion in those countries is still in an early phase (mainly the 
specification of a national climate change mitigation program to specify the 
necessary responsibilities). 
With the starting date of the European trading scheme coming closer and in 
particular with the allocation of ‘emission allowances’ becoming clearer, 
many companies that expect to be affected are preparing to trade in the EU 
carbon market. During 2003, numerous ‘test-trades’ with a total volume of 
around 600,000 tons of CO2 equivalent at prices ranging from EUR 5 per ton 
in April to EUR 12 per ton in December have been reported.7 These trades do 
not only include ‘emission allowances’ valid in 2005, but also future options 
on emission allowances in later years. 
 
5. Implications and recommendations for Ukraine 
What are the implications of the European trading scheme for non-EU 
countries? As stated above, the European trading scheme allows for imports 
of emission reductions generated within the project-based mechanisms of 
the Kyoto protocol in non-EU countries. Since the European trading scheme 
forces all member states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, there 
will be a strong net demand for emission allowances. Against this 
background, imports of additional emission reductions are beneficial for 
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both, non-EU countries who find solvent buyers of their emission reduction 
certificates (generated within the project-based mechanisms of the Kyoto 
protocol) and the EU economy for which those imports are necessary to keep 
the costs of the European trading scheme on acceptable levels. While in 
principle this direction of emission trade flows has already been expected 
within the trading scheme of the Kyoto protocol, the European trading 
scheme generates a great more deal of security for the evolving market 
since its introduction has irreversibly been decided, independently of 
whether the Kyoto protocol will eventually get into force. 
Among all countries that signed the Kyoto protocol, the potential of 
benefiting from the project based Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is 
estimated to be the most promising in Ukraine.8 Consequently, Ukraine could 
also become one of the main beneficiaries of the European trading scheme. 
For example, Ukraine’s National Strategy Study for Joint Implementation and 
emissions trading9 specifies 13 potential JI projects with an overall emission 
reduction of around 30 m tons of CO2 equivalent. With present prices for 
‘emission allowances’ slightly above EUR 10 per ton of CO2 equivalent this 
corresponds to revenues of EUR 300 m to EUR 400 m. 
Despite such potential, Ukrainian policy makers have done little to utilize or 
even secure the benefits. As a result, Ukraine has so far not at all 
participated in the evolving market for emission reduction certificates10 and 
its legal and technical capacity to host such projects are estimated to be the 
lowest among all transition countries.11 Thus, the crucial precondition for 
Ukraine to utilize its potential within the European trading scheme is the 
                                                                                                                                     
7 “Carbon Market Europe”, January 9-2004 (www.pointcarbon.com); The World Bank 
(2003): State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2003. Washington DC. 
8 Fankhauser, S. and L Lavric. The Investment Climate for Climate Investment: Joint 
Implementation in Transition Countries. EBRD Working Paper No. 77 (2003). 
9 Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Ukraine, Kiev 2003. 
10 Although the Kyoto protocol is set to start only in 2008 (and the EU-ETS in 2005) several 
firms and public institutions have already started to buy certificates from emission-reducing 
projects in anticipation of future regulations. From 2002 till Q3 2003 already more than 90 
m tons of CO2 equivalent, mainly stemming from projects in Latin America and Asia, have 
been traded (The World Bank: State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2003. Washington 
DC). 
11 Fankhauser, S. and L Lavric. The Investment Climate for Climate Investment: Joint 
Implementation in Transition Countries. EBRD Working Paper No. 77 (2003). 
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improvement of domestic conditions for JI projects. This in particular 
requires two measures: 
(1) Ratification of the Kyoto protocol as soon as possible. 
This is the pre-condition for any participation in any emissions trading 
scheme, including the European trading scheme. It is a rather simple task 
since the respective law has already been submitted to the Verkovna Rhada 
and just needs to be approved. 
(2) Creation of conditions for full participation in JI projects. 
This measure will be more difficult to achieve. The conditions necessary for 
ensuring transparency and credibility of JI projects have been specified in 
the Marrakesh Accords in 2001. In the short run, it requires that countries 
sign bilateral contracts with potential partner countries in which both 
signatories confirm their general compliance with the rules of the Kyoto 
protocol. In the long run, the Marrakesh Accords establish standards for 
institutions that sufficiently estimate own greenhouse gas emissions and 
register, record and monitor the transfer of emission reductions certificates 
between countries. Consequently, the signing of memorandums of 
understanding with interested EU countries as well as with institutions such 
as the Prototype Carbon Fund of the World Bank would already be sufficient 
to kickstart JI projects in Ukraine. In the long run however, policy makers 
must also focus on building up the necessary intuitions. 
 
F.P. Lector: R.G. 
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